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Note, United States v. Palestine Liberation Organization:




In United States v. Palestine Liberation Organization, ' the District
Court for the Southern District of New York held that the Anti-ter-
rorism Act of 19872 did not apply to the United States' efforts to close
the PLO's observer mission to the United Nations. Under a previous
treaty, the Headquarters Agreement of 1947,1 the United States un-
dertook an obligation to provide headquarters arrangements for
United Nations members in New York. The court faced a simple is-
sue. Did the subsequent congressional legislation contradict the treaty
and, if so, which of the two should settle this dispute? The court con-
cluded that since Congress had not expressly stated its intention to
overrule the treaty, the ATA could not be interpreted to bring about
that result.
Terrorist acts aimed at American citizens have increased signifi-
cantly since 1980.4 Amidst this climate, a number of Congressmen
requested in October, 1986 that the State Department close all offices
located in the United States operated by or on behalf of the PLO.5
When the State Department rejected this request, Representatives
Jack Kemp (R-N.Y.) and Dan Mica (D-Fla.), and Senators Charles
Grassley (R-Iowa) and Frank Lautenberg (D-N.J.) sponsored a bill
* University of Michigan Law School, Class of 1990.
1. 695 F.Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
2. The Anti-terrorism Act, 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 5201-5203 (West Supp. 1988) [hereinafter
"ATA"].
3. Agreement Between the United Nations and the United States of America Regarding the
Headquarters of the United Nations, 22 U.S.C. § 287 (1947) [hereinafter "The Headquarters
Agreement"].
4. Examples of increasing terrorism include the bombings of American military bases in Bei-
rut and of a German disco, the taking of American hostages in Lebanon, the hi-jacking of the
Achille Lauro cruise liner, and the bombings in Paris in the summer of 1986. The Palestine
Liberation Organization publicly admitted responsibility for the Achille Lauro hijacking. PLO
involvement in the other terrorist incidents is suspected as well. Americans were killed in each of
the terrorist incidents in Beirut, Berlin, and on the Achille Lauro.
5. 695 F.Supp. at 1459-60. This Note examines only those aspects of the ATA's legislative
history necessary to address the issue of whether Congress intended to supersede the Headquar-
ters Agreement. For a more detailed examination of the ATA's legislative history, see Note,
Reviving the Doctrine of Non-Forcible Countermeasures. Resolving the Effect of Third Party Inju-
ries, 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 175 (1988).
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proposing to close all PLO offices.6 The bill resulted in the ATA,
which was debated for over a year before it became effective on March
21, 1988. Passing as a rider to the Foreign Relations Authorization
Act for Fiscal Years 1988-89, the ATA consists of three sections -
Findings, Prohibitions, and Enforcement. 7
Section 5201 details Congress' findings that the PLO and its con-
stituent groups have taken credit for the murders of dozens of Ameri-
can citizens abroad.8 In response, the Act prohibits any person or
group in the United States from receiving anything of value from the
PLO or from employing funds to pursue PLO goals.9 Most important
for the purposes of this Note, the Act states:
It shall be unlawful...
(3) notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, to establish
or maintain an office, headquarters, premises, or other facilities or estab-
lishments within the jurisdiction of the United States at the behest or
direction of, or with funds provided by the Palestine Liberation Organi-
zation or any of its constituent groups, any successor to any of those, or
any agents thereof.'0
These Congressmen, rebuked by the State Department a year earlier,
convinced Congress that the PLO's involvement in terrorism war-
ranted, among other prohibitions, the closing of all PLO offices.
Congress placed the power to enforce the ATA in the Attorney
General's hands." In reaction to the perceived increase in terrorist
activities, the Attorney General implemented this power the day the
ATA came into effect and filed suit in the Southern District of New
York, seeking an injunction to close the PLO's observer mission to the
United Nations in New York City. 12 The PLO responded by claiming
that closing the mission would violate the Headquarters Agreement.
It specifically cited section 11 of the treaty, which provides in part:
The federal, state or local authorities of the United States shall not
impose any impediments to transit to or from the headquarters district
of..
(4) representatives of nongovernmental organizations recognized by
the United Nations for the purpose of consultation under article 71 of
the Charter, or
(5) other persons invited to the headquarters district by the United Na-
6. 133 CONG. REC. S18,190 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1987) (statement of Rep. Helms).
7. See Appendix A; the full text of the ATA has been included to illustrate how specifically
the statute focused on the PLO.
8. See id. § 5201(a)(l)-(7); Congress states at § 5201(a)(3) that "the PLO and its constituent
groups have taken credit for, and have been implicated in, the murders of dozens of American
citizens abroad."
9. Id. §§ 5202(l), 5202(2).
10. Id. § 5202(3).
I. Id. § 5203(a).
12. U.S. v. PLO, 695 F.Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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tions or by such specialized agency on official business.13
The PLO also referred to section 12 of the Headquarters Agreement,
which guarantees that the provisions of section 11 shall apply "irre-
spective of the relations existing between the Governments of the per-
sons referred to in that section and the Government of the United
States."' 4 The PLO, an invitee to the United Nations since 1974, ar-
gued that the ATA's proposed closing of its observer mission to the
U.N. would violate these provisions. The court in U.S. v. PLO '5
agreed that the ATA did not require the closing of the PLO's office. It
rejected the PLO's argument, however, and based its holding on Con-
gress' failure to express its intention to abrogate the Headquarters
Agreement. Since the Headquarters Agreement remained intact, the
ATA did not permit the closing of the PLO office.
This Note concludes that while the court's rationale is disingenu-
ous and misleading, the final decision was an appropriate reaffirmation
of the importance which American jurisprudence places on interna-
tional obligations. In Part One, this Note discusses whether the dis-
pute resolution provisions of the Headquarters Agreement precluded
the district court's jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of
this case. Part Two examines the constitutional hierarchy of the ATA
and the Headquarters Agreement to determine which should govern
this dispute. If the court had concluded that it lacked jurisdiction, the
case would have been dismissed from the U.S. court system, leaving
the parties to settle the dispute in the International Court of Justice. If
the court reached the merits and applied the Headquarters Agreement
despite the ATA, the PLO office would have remained open. Had the
ATA applied, the PLO office would have been closed and the relevant
provisions of the Headquarters Agreement would no longer be valid in
United States courts.
THE JURISDICTION ISSUE
In United States v. PLO, the New York district court first ad-
dressed the defendant PLO's claim that it lacked jurisdiction. In sup-
port of this claim, the PLO relied on section 21 of the Headquarters
Agreement which provides:
(a) Any dispute between the United Nations and the United States
concerning the interpretation or application of this agreement or of any
supplemental agreement, which is not settled by negotiation or other
agreed mode of settlement, shall be referred for final decision to a tribu-
nal of three arbitrators ....
(b) The Secretary-General of the United States may ask the General
Assembly to request of the International Court of Justice an advisory
13. The Headquarters Agreement, supra note 3, § 11.
14. Id. § 12.
15. 695 F.Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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opinion on any legal question arising in the course of such proceedings
16
The PLO contended that the dispute over the ATA concerned the "in-
terpretation or application" of the Headquarters Agreement and, cit-
ing section 21(a), insisted that the United States should submit the
case to an international board of arbitration.
The district court rejected the PLO's claims and based its personal
jurisdiction over the defendants upon the "mininimum contacts" re-
quirements set forth in International Shoe Co. v. State of Washing-
ton.17 It concluded that the PLO maintained such minimum contacts
within the court's jurisdiction through its office, telephone number,
and year-round staff of employees in New York. 18 The court per-
ceived that the jurisdiction issue was vital to the case, and addressed
the personal jurisdiction issue despite the fact that the "presence" of
the defendants within the territory of the Southern District of New
York was not disputed. Such caution might be explained by the
court's awareness that the United States' alleged duty to arbitrate was
a clouded issue, considering the language of section 21(a). Establish-
ing its undisputed personal jurisdiction at the outset lent credence to
the eventual decision concerning subject matter jurisdiction.
Pursuant to section 21(b) of the Headquarters Agreement, the In-
ternational Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion concluding
that the United States was bound by the agreement to arbitrate.' 9 The
New York court, however, declined to follow the advisory opinion. It
concluded that "because these proceedings are not in any way directed
to settling any dispute, ripe or not, between the United Nations and
the United States, section 21 is, by its own terms, inapplicable.
'20
Although the court claimed that the United Nations was not involved
in the dispute, it permitted the U.N. to file amicus briefs. In addition,
the Under Secretary-General and Legal Counsel of the United Na-
tions21 was permitted to address the court at the outset of the case.
22
The mere existence of the advisory opinion indicates that the United
Nations considered itself as having an interest in the dispute. The
16. Headquarters Agreement, supra note 3, § 21.
17. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Here, the Court determined that even though a Delaware
corporation did not have offices in the state of Washington, its regular solicitation of orders in the
state represented "minimum contacts" sufficient to meet jurisdiction requirements.
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam,
if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts
with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.
18. 695 F.Supp. at 1461.
19. United Nations v. United States, 1988 I.C.J. No. 77 (April 26, 1988).
20. 695 F.Supp. at 1462.
21. Carl-August Fleischauer.
22. 695 F.Supp. at 1458 n.** (as cited in the court's opinion).
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New York court failed to address that interest adequately, disposing of
the issue in this single, conclusory statement.
The court provided two additional reasons why the interpretation
of the Headquarters Agreement's relation to the ATA was not auto-
matically submitted to arbitration. First, the court stated that since
this case involved matters of international policy, it differed from ordi-
nary arbitration disputes. The court claimed to lack authority to
make such decisions in the international arena, given the Executive's
decision to bring the case to the federal courts. Judge Palmieri wrote:
This [matters of international policy] is an area in which the courts are
generally unable to participate. These questions do not lend themselves
to resolution by adjudication under our jurisprudence. The restrictions
imposed upon the courts forbidding them to resolve such questions
(often termed 'political questions') derive not only from the limitations
which inhere in the judicial process but from those imposed by article III
of the Constitution. 23
Ordering the United States to arbitrate, according to Palmieri, would
have created a tension, characteristic of a "political question," as set
down by the Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr.
2 4
Resolution of the question whether the United States will arbitrate re-
quires "an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion;" deciding whether the United States will or ought to submit
to arbitration, in the face of a determination not to do so by the execu-
tive, would be impossible without the court "expressing lack of the re-
spect due coordinate branches of the government;" and such a decision
would raise not only the "potentiality" if [sic] but the reality of "em-
barassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments
on one question."
25
The court thus concluded that, by filing the suit in the federal courts,
the Executive had made a "foreign policy" decision against arbitra-
tion, which the judiciary was powerless to challenge. Yet, it never
illustrated how the international aspect of this situation, where the
United States and the United Nations agreed between themselves
when arbitration would be required, substantively differed from any
other contract situation where two parties agree to submit disputes to
an abitrator. Section 21 created a difficult obstacle for the court to
23. 695 F.Supp. at 1462 (citation omitted).
24. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). Justice Brennan elaborated several formulations of what ele-
ments might exist in determining that a function is reserved for the political branches:
[P]rominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textu-
ally demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political depart-
ment; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonju-
dicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution with-
out expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or the unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
25. 695 F.Supp. at 1463 (citations omitted).
Michigan Journal of International Law
overcome and, rather than addressing the issue directly, the court
chose to cloak itself in the political question doctrine.
2 6
The court's second argument supporting subject matter jurisdic-
tion further illustrates the ineffectiveness of applying the political
question doctrine to matters concerning treaties. The court argued
that binding the United States to the Headquarters Agreement settle-
ment process would amount to ignoring its "constitutionally man-
dated function" to interpret congressional legislation. 27 Despite the
requirements of section 21, the court apparently believed it was bound
to interpret the ATA. The ATA's potential effect on the Headquar-
ters Agreement and the United Nations Charter required that those
two documents must also be considered. However, the true "subject
matter" at issue, in the court's view, was the interpretation of the
ATA. Citing Marbury v. Madison,28 Palmieri wrote:
It is, as Chief Justice Marshall said, "emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is." That duty will not be
resolved without independent adjudication of the effect of the ATA on
the Headquarters Agreement. Awaiting the decision of an arbitral tribu-
nal would be a repudiation of that duty.
29
The court therefore claimed to carry out its constitutionally mandated
responsibility by deciding a question which it considered to be beyond
the scope of its constitutional responsibility. It concluded that it had
subject matter jurisdiction in this case because submitting the case to
arbitration would violate the court's "constitutionally mandated func-
tion" to interpret congressional legislation. The court reached this
conlcusion despite its concurrent determination that the political ques-
tion doctrine prevented it from deciding whether arbitration was ap-
propriate as a foreign policy.
The contradiction in this line of reasoning is evident. At the out-
set, the court was faced with two choices: 1) send the case to interna-
tional arbitration; or, 2) retain it and decide the merits. According to
the court's rationale, it was incapable of making this decision, since
arbitration was a foreign policy decision which must have fallen to the
political branches of the government. However, since the proposed
arbitration would involve the interpretation of a domestic statute, the
court saw itself as bound by the United States Constitution to see that
the statute was interpreted by a United States court. Despite all of its
claims that it was unfit to make the decision concerning arbitration,
the court effectively decided to retain the case and reach the merits.
Such confusion often results when courts are faced with a strong de-
26. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
27. 695 F.Supp. at 1463.
28. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
29. 695 F.Supp. at 1464.
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sire to avoid the trappings of the political question doctrine.
30
The court's handling of the jurisdiction issue illustrates many of
the problems involved with the political question doctrine. The evils
expressed in Baker v. Carr, 31 such as embarassment from "multifari-
ous pronouncements," are not illusory. The foreign policy of the
United States is left to the Executive and Legislative branches of the
government. Once those branches have concluded what the foreign
policies of the country will be, courts must still interpret that law as it
applies domestically within the United States.
The judicial responsibility, however, does not include an unre-
strained power to ignore a treaty which might have domestic effects or
a statute which touches on international agreements. Article VI of the
Constitution makes treaties the supreme law of the land, on an equal
level with congressional statutes. 32 Accordingly, courts should feel
compelled to address the merits of the dispute before them, regardless
of whether a treaty or a congressional statute is at issue. Leaving no
doubt about his disapproval of the political question doctrine, Profes-
sor Henkin discussed the subject in a follow-up article to his analysis
of the Chinese Exclusion Case and its progeny.3 3 Henkin notes that
since 1789, states have opened their courts to disputes concerning
treaty violations, often granting remedies for private petitioners, but
not governments:
Indeed, when a foreign national claims to have been injured by a state's
violation of international law, the state can insist that the claim be pur-
sued in its own courts and that no international claim be brought by the
complaining party's state of nationality until domestic remedies are ex-
hausted. If the framers intended to close our courts to suits for a breach
of a treaty, there would be no more reason to open the courts to a private
beneficiary of a treaty than to a foreign government. Nor would there be
any reason to permit suits on a treaty when there had been no act of
Congress on the subject, or when an act anteceded the treaty.
Treaties are the law of the land. Cases arising under treaties are
justiciable.
34
Henkin's approach avoids the pitfalls of the political question doctrine
- whether the facts at issue include or invoke the characteristic ele-
ments of a "political question" and, if not, whether those facts should
constitute an addition to the list espoused in Baker v. Carr.
Treaties are the supreme law of the land. Cases arising under them
should be justiciable regardless of whether Congress has passed subse-
30. See Henkin, Is There A "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976).
31. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
32. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
33. Henkin, Lexical Priority or "Political Question ": A Response, 101 HARV. L.R. 524 (1987);
For the initial article, see infra note 64. The Chinese Exclusion Case is the seminal case for the
hierarchy issue, infra.
34. Id. at 531 (footnote omitted).
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quent legislation, unless that legislation directly overrules the treaty.
Discussions of whether the Executive's decision to submit the case to
arbitration represents a "political" or "foreign policy" issue should be
eliminated. The Executive and the Senate addressed that issue when
the treaty was signed. If the treaty's dispute resolution provisions ap-
ply, then the court should give credence to them. If the court sees a
reason why those provisions should not apply, then it should suc-
cinctly state its reasoning and reach the merits of the case. Such a
logical and concise argument should have been adopted by the courts
some time ago.
The district court's discussion of the jurisdiction issue was an op-
portunity lost. The court could have challenged the appellate levels of
the federal system by making a critical argument, like Henkin's, about
the political question doctrine. It might have recognized that no case
involving a treaty claim has been held to be nonjusticiable, and that
the addition of a more recent act of Congress effectively adds nothing
which should alter that trend.35 More simply, the court could have
argued solely the second tenet of its rationale, recognizing that the
Constitution requires federal courts to interpret congressional legisla-
tion. If it becomes necessary to consider foreign treaties, then the
court should consider them. This is essentially what the PLO court
did in effect, but the strength and credibility of the argument is lost by
the lip service paid to the political question doctrine. Had the court
used the challenging analysis outlined above, its analysis would have
been far more coherent than the contradictory line of reasoning which
it employed, especially where the Administration's indifference to the
case indicated that numerous appeals would be unlikely.36 Despite its




Once the court dispensed with the jurisdiction question, it faced
the substantive issue of the case: whether the ATA effectively over-
ruled the Headquarters Agreement as it applies to the PLO observer
mission to the United Nations. The court had to determine which
should govern, the treaty or the subsequent congressional statute. If it
had determined that the ATA should govern this dispute, then the
provisions in sections 11 and 12 of the Headquarters Agreement
35. Id. at note 34.
36. While the case was pending, Secretary of State George Schultz described the ATA as
"one of the dumbest things Congress did last year." N.Y. Times, April 27, 1988, at AI0, Col. 4.
37. As illustrated in the text, the court's reasoning concerning the applicability of § 21 of the
Headquarters Agreement is neither definitive nor completely honest. If the court were to con-
clude that § 21 must be enforced, as the International Court of Justice believed it must, then the
court would never have reached the hierarchy issue and could have disposed of the case.
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would no longer apply in domestic United States law. The Supremacy
Clause states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
38
The Supremacy Clause thus provides that treaties and congressional
legislation are superior to state law. It provides no basis, however, to
choose one over the other when the two conflict. The Supreme Court
addressed this issue in The Head Money Cases,3 9 sparking a series of
cases concerning Congress' power to regulate immigration and the hi-
erarchy of law concerning treaties and congressional legislation. In
1882, 40 Congress passed an act calling for the payment of a duty at
every port for each passenger lacking U.S. citizenship. 4' The act con-
flicted with several treaties, particularly one with Russia, which obli-
gated the United States to restrict such customs duties.42 Following a
lengthy discussion in which the Court concluded that the tariff fell
within the scope of Congress' power to regulate commerce, it turned
to the Supremacy Clause. After quoting the relevant text, Justice
Miller stated that,
[A] treaty, then, is a law of the land as an act of Congress is, whenever
its provisions prescribe a rule by which the rights of the private citizen or
subject may be determined ... [b]ut even in this aspect of the case there
is nothing in this law which makes it irrepealable or unchangeable. The
Constitution gives it no superiority over an act of Congress in this re-
spect, which may be repealed or modified by an act of a later date.4
3
The Head Money Court concluded that when faced with a treaty and
an incompatible subsequent statute, the statute should be considered
Congress' most recent modification of the subject matter in the treaty.
The Court further argued that the procedural requirements in making
a treaty are different than those for passing a bill. First, the Constitu-
tion gives the President and the Senate sole responsibility for negotiat-
ing and ratifying a treaty.44 The House of Representatives, however,
is included in the decision-making process which spawns domestic
38. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
39. 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
40. The Supreme Court addressed the hierarchy issue repeatedly in a series of decisions in
the late nineteenth century. These cases are usually cited in any discussion of the issue, and the
PLO court relies on them extensively. Despite the passing of a century, these cases are still valid
constitutional law.
41. Act of August 3, 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214.
42. Treaty on Liberty of Commerce and Navigation, Dec. 18, 1832, United States - Russia, 8
Stat. 444.
43. 112 U.S. at 598-99.
44. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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law. Decisions made by both houses, according to the Court, are fa-
vored in the face of conflicting international agreements. "In short,
we are of the opinion that, so far as a treaty made by the United States
with any foreign nation can become the subject of judicial cognizance
in the courts of this country, it is subject to such acts as Congress may
[subsequently] pass for its enforcement, modification, or repeal."
45
This line of reasoning was continued three years later in Whitney v.
Robertson.46 There, New York merchants were forced to pay a duty
on sugar imported from the Dominican Republic under an act of Con-
gress. 47 Prior to that legislation's enactment, the United States had
signed a treaty with the Dominican Republic which included a "most
favored nation" clause.48 The United States had also entered a simi-
lar treaty with the King of Hawaii, and imported similar sugars from
those islands duty-free. 49 The Court, emphasizing that the domestic
legislation was passed after the treaty, followed the Head Money pre-
cedent holding that the domestic legislation governed. "When the
stipulations [treaties] are not self-executing they can only be enforced
pursuant to legislation to carry them into effect, and such legislation is
as much subject to modification and repeal by Congress as legislation
upon any other subject." 50 The Court went on to state that its respon-
sibility lay only in interpreting those acts of Congress establishing or
changing law. Issues of "[w]hether the complaining nation has just
cause of complaint, or our country was justified in its legislation, are
not matters for judicial cognizance."
'5 1
In 1888, the Supreme Court concluded for the third time in four
years that an act of Congress, passed subsequent to and in contradic-
tion with a treaty must still be enforced. 52 Twenty years earlier, the
United States and the Chinese Empire had recognized "the inherent
and inalienable right" of citizens from either country to travel to the
other "for purposes of curiosity, of trade, or as permanent resi-
dents."'5 3 The discovery of gold on the Pacific coast brought vast num-
bers of people to California, including many Chinese. The substantial
increase in population created a competitive atmosphere for employ-
45. 112 U.S. at 599 (emphasis added).
46. 124 U.S. 190 (1887).
47. Convention of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, October 24, 1867, United States -
Dominican Republic, 15 Stat. 473.
48. A "most favored nation" clause grants any advantage, privilege, immunity, or favor
given by one party to the treaty to any third country to the other parties to the treaty. See
generally J. JACKSON AND W. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RE-
LATIONS 428-482 (2d ed. 1986).
49. Convention on Commercial Reciprocity, June 3, 1875, United States - Hawaiian Islands,
19 Stat. 625.
50. 124 U.S. at 194 (emphasis added).
51. 124 U.S. at 194.
52. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1888).
53. Treaty, July 28, 1868, United States - China, art. V, 16 Stat. 739, 740.
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ment and wealth, leading to strong racial tensions and prejudice. As a
result, Congress began to restrict immigration into the United States.
In 1881, the United States signed a treaty effectively giving it an escape
clause from its previous obligations. That treaty stated:
Whenever in the opinion of the Government of the United States, the
coming of Chinese laborers to the United States, or their residence
therein, affects or threatens to affect the interests of that country, or to
endanger the good order of the said country or of any locality within the
territory thereof, the Government of China agrees that the Government
of United States may regulate, limit, or suspend such coming or resi-
dence, but may not prohibit it.
5a
In the following seven years, the U.S. Government stretched this es-
cape clause to its limits and, eventually, it went beyond even that
point.
In 1882, Congress passed legislation,55 further suspending immi-
gration of Chinese laborers into the United States for a period of ten
years. The Government would issue a certificate to anyone leaving the
United States which ensured that person a legal right to return. Rela-
tives and friends, however, would often persuade authorities to allow
their Chinese compatriots to re-enter the U.S. without these certifi-
cates. Congress responded by passing new legislation in 1884.56
Under this new law, only the certificate was sufficient to establish the
Chinese immigrant's right to re-enter. In Chew Heong v. United
States,5 7 the Supreme Court held that this act did not apply to laborers
who had departed the United States prior to May, 1882 and had not
yet returned when the 1884 Act was passed. The same loose re-entry
requirements, however, permitted people to return to the United
States without the necessary certificates. In 1888, Congress passed yet
another act, this time closing the United States to all Chinese laborers
not in the country on the day of the act's passage, regardless of their
residence or possession of a certificate. 58 The plaintiffs in Chinese Ex-
clusion challenged this act. 59
The Chinese Exclusion Court first concluded that the Constitution
empowered Congress to regulate immigration under the constitutional
provisions concerning sovereignty over subject matter - those which
affect "the interests of the whole people equally and alike," such as the
Commerce Clause.60 Following Whitney, 61 the Court again recog-
nized that the Supremacy Clause places treaties and congressional leg-
54. Art. I, 22 Stat. 826, quoted in Chinese Exclusion, 130 U.S. at 596.
55. Ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58-61 (1882).
56. Act of July 5, 1884, ch. 220, 23 Stat. 115.
57. 112 U.S. 536 (1884).
58. Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504.
59. 130 U.S. 581.
60. 130 U.S. at 605.
61. 124 U.S. 190 (1887).
Michigan Journal of International Law
islation on an equal basis, thus rejecting the inference in favor of
domestic legislation espoused in Head Money. 62 It further stated that
"[w]hen once it is established that Congress possesses the power to
pass an act, our province ends with its construction, and its applica-
tion to cases as they are presented for determination. ' 63 The Court
concluded that the treaties with China placed no restrictions on Con-
gress' power to restrict immigration, apparently ignoring the language
of the 1881 treaty. Under this reasoning, all treaties are repealable or
reversible by subsequent acts of Congress.
The Chinese Exclusion Case has remained sound precedent for a
full century. Commentators who have scrutinized its reasoning, how-
ever, have been critical. Most recently, Professor Henkin addressed
the case and it progeny. 64 He concluded that the two doctrines ad-
dressed by the case (the regulation of immigration and the obligations
of the United States to adhere to international agreements) have come
back to haunt us one hundred years later. He specifically pointed to a
1986 case in which the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held
that indefinite detention of undocumented aliens is not unconstitu-
tional. The court stated that although such detention violated interna-
tional law, that violation was not determinative since it had been
effected by the Attorney General's office.
65
In his discussion of the relationship between treaties and statutes,
Henkin criticizes the Supreme Court's decisions in Head Money,
Whitney, and Chinese Exclusion, noting that several countries consider
international obligations to be superior to domestic legislation.
Although the Court [in Head Money] asserted that nothing "in its essen-
tial character" gives a treaty "superior sanctity," treaties may indeed
have superior sanctity because of their essential character as interna-
tional obligations, a principal [sic] that other systems of law have ac-
cepted. Unlike an act of Congress, under the law of nations a treaty is
binding on the United States and therefore on all branches of the govern-
ment. Neither the text nor the history of the Constitution suggests that
the framers intended that Congress have authority to disregard the inter-
national obligations of the United States.66
Henkin admits that the application of the Chinese Exclusion doctrine
has not seriously harmed the United States in its relations with other
countries. This is the result of an early precedent set down in Murray
62. 112 U.S. at 600.
63. 112 U.S. at 603.
64. Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion
and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853 (1987); cf., Westin, The Place of Foreign Treaties in the
Courts of the United States. A Reply To Henkin, 101 HARV. L. REV. 511 (1987).
65. Id., at 864, n. 54. See, Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (1Ith Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 889 (1986). This case serves as a striking example for Henkin's conclusion that the lesson of
Chinese Exclusion is that "courts are prepared to abdicate their responsibility to ensure that the
executive act in conformity with international law." Henkin, supra note 64 at 854.
66. Henkin, supra note 64, at 871 (footnote omitted).
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v. The Schooner Charming Betsy.67 There, Chief Justice Marshall said
"an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of
nations if any other possible construction remains."' 68 Moreover, Hen-
kin included the spirit of this holding in the third edition of the Re-
statement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States:
§ 115. Inconsistency Between International Law or Agreement and
Domestic Law: Law of the United States
(1) (a) An act of Congress supersedes an earlier rule of interna-
tional law or a provision of an international agreement as law of the
United States if the purpose of the act to supersede the earlier rule or
provision is clear or if the act and the earlier rule or provision cannot
be fairly reconciled.
(b) That a rule of international law or a provision of an inter-
national agreement is superseded as domestic law does not relieve the
United States of its international obligation or of the consequences of
a violation of that obligation.
69
The notion that courts should not presume that Congress would sur-
reptitiously violate international obligations is part of the original
foundations of American jurisprudence.
This is the legal environment in which the ATA case was decided.
The PLO court began its discussion of the hierarchy issue by admitting
that the ATA, as applied by the Attorney General's office, would be
inconsistent with the Headquarters Agreement. It then stated that the
Constitution places both legislation and treaties on equal footing, but
offers no methods by which to choose between the two. Next, the
court, in a relatively off-handed way, made a statement which deter-
mined the outcome of the case: "Only where a treaty is irreconciliable
with a later enacted statute and Congress has clearly evinced an intent
to supersede a treaty by enacting a statute does the later enacted statute
take precedence." ' 70 The court then outlined the history of the ATA,
67. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
68. Id. at 118.
69. Henkin served as the Chief Reporter for the ALI's most recent revision of the Restate-
ment (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States. I RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (1986).
70. 695 F.Supp. at 1464 (emphasis added). It should be noted that the first case cited by the
court to support this proposition is Chinese Exclusion, which clearly did not set down this princi-
ple as it is stated here. The other cases cited include: The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580
(1884); Chew Heong, 112 U.S. 536 (1884); South African Airways v. Dole, 817 F.2d 119, 126
(D.C. Cir. 1987); Diggs v. Schultz, 470 F.2d 461, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Menominee Tribe of
Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1968); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de
Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22 (1963); and Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102
(1933).
In Menominee Tribe, the Court said, "While the power to abrogate those rights [conferred by
treaty] exists, 'the intention to abrogate or modify a treaty is not to be lightly imputed to the
Congress," In McCulloch, the Court stated, "... for us to sanction the exercise of local sover-
eignty under such conditions in this 'delicate field of international relations there must be present
the affirmative intention of the Congress.' " In Diggs, the Circuit Court, facing a conflict be-
tween the Byrd Amendment and the U.N. Charter, stated the Charming Betsy doctrine and
refused to address the issue, deeming it a political question. The court did make the statement
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concluding that Congress never had a clear intent to supersede the
Headquarters Agreement.
First, the court followed the Whitney precedent, recognizing that
Congress has the power to pass legislation abrogating prior treaties or
international obligations. Rather than ending its discussion at that
point, however, the court made an interpretive addition to The
Charming Betsy's doctrine, stating that "unless this power is clearly
and unequivocably exercised, this court is under a duty to interpret
statutes in a manner consonant with existing treaty obligations."' 71
The court cited a dubious line of cases to support this requirement of
an express statement by Congress of its intent to abrogate a prior
treaty. 72 Although it pointed to both Chinese Exclusion and The
Charming Betsy, the Court could not rely on specific quotations from
either opinion because no such quotation existed. In fact, the only
passage which the court did cite came from a dissenting opinion in
Chew Heong v. United States.73 As noted earlier, the statute in that
case was later amended, and became the subject of the Chinese Exclu-
sion case. There, Congress' intent to violate the previous treaties sup-
posedly became clear some four years after the Chew Heong decision.
Yet, the court claims that these cases "require the clearest of expres-
sions on the part of Congress .... Congress' failure to speak with one
clear voice on this subject requires us to interpret the ATA as inappli-
cable to the Headquarters Agreement." ' 74
The true origin of this clear congressional intent requirement is
worth examining. The district court's opinion is misleading because it
suggests that this doctrine is supported by a series of citations dating
from 1884 to 1984.7- Close examination of these cases reveals that the
Supreme Court has been historically disingenuous in its application of
that "under our constitutional scheme, Congress can denounce treaties if it sees fit to do so, and
there is nothing that the other branches of government can do about it." In South African Air-
ways, the same court gave a lengthy discussion of the Charming Betsy and Chew Heong decisions,
but closed its argument with a quote from Whitney; "[I]t is wholly immaterial to inquire whether
by the act... [Congress] has departed from the [Agreement] or not, or whether such departure was
by accident or design .... (emphasis by the court). For the Court's treatment of the doctrine in
Cook, see infra, at 949.
71. 695 F.Supp. at 1465 (emphasis added).
72. See supra n. 70.
73. 112 U.S. 536 (1884). In Cheow Heong, Justice Field said,
I am unable to agree with my associates in their construction of the act ... restricting the
immigration into this country of Chinese laborers. That construction appears to me to be in
conflict with the language of that act, and to require the elimination of entire clauses and the
interpolation of new ones. It renders nugatory whole provisions which were inserted with
sedulous care. The change thus produced in the operation of the act is justified on the
theory that to give it any other construction would bring it into conflict with the treaty; and
that we are not at liberty to suppose that Congress intended by its legislation to disregard
any treaty stipulations.
74. 695 F.Supp. at 1468.
75. Id. at 1464-5.
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the rule. First, in Chew Heong, the Court never specifically set down a
rule of law on the subject of Congress' clear intent:
When the act of 1882 was passed, Congress was aware of the obligation
this government had recently assumed, by solemn treaty, to accord a
certain class of Chinese laborers the privilege of going from and coming
to this country at their pleasure. Did it intend, within less than a year
after the ratification of the treaty, and without so declaring in unmistak-
able terms, to withdraw that privilege... ? Did it intend to do what
would be inconsistent with the inviolable fidelity with which, according
to the established rules of international law, the stipulation of treaties
should be observed? These questions must receive a negative answer.76
While the overall tenor of the Chew Heong opinion might illustrate an
attempt to determine what Congress' intent might have been, the pas-
sage above was clearly dictum, and it certainly should not stand as a
firm expression of law requiring express congressional intent to abro-
gate prior treaties.
In Cook v. United States,7 7 however, the Supreme Court applied
Chew Heong. In Cook, a 1924 treaty between the United States and
Great Britain allowed American officials to board British ships outside
the three mile territorial boundary if the ships were suspected of smug-
gling alcohol into the United States. The Tariff Act of 1922 had previ-
ously authorized Coast Guard officials to board British vessels "within
four leagues of the coast." Congress reiterated the "four league" lan-
guage in the Tariff Act of 1930, without reference to the treaty. In
holding that the 1930 act did not supersede the treaty, the Court made
a single, simple statement of law; "A treaty will not be deemed to have
been abrogated or modified by a later statute unless such purpose on
the part of Congress has been clearly expressed. '78 As precedent for
this doctrine, the Court cited Chew Heong, which has been shown to
be an inappropriate source, and United States v. Paine.79 In the latter,
the Court stated only that the legislation in that case "should be har-
monized with the letter and spirit of the treaty so far as that reason-
ably can be done, since an intention to alter, and, pro tanto, abrogate,
the treaty, is not to be lightly attributed to Congress." 80 The Supreme
Court in Cook, therefore, created the "clear, express intent" doctrine,
based solely on a fifty year old paragraph of dictum and an amorphous
belief that Congress would prefer, if possible, not to violate the United
States' international obligations.
Having established the legal standard, the district court then tried
to show that Congress did not intend to supersede the Headquarters
Agreement with the ATA. First, the court examined the text of the
76. 112 U.S. at 550.
77. 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
78. 288 U.S. at 120.
79. 264 U.S. 446 (1923).
80. 264 U.S. at 448.
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ATA itself, searching for evidence of Congress' intent on the face of
the document; neither the PLO office nor the Headquarters Agree-
ment is mentioned explicitly. The court then noted that while the act
did prohibit maintaining an office "notwithstanding any provision of
law to the contrary," such language should not be taken to mean that
the act applied notwithstanding any treaty, especially when such exact
language was used elsewhere in the text.8' The question arose, then,
as to what else lay outside the scope of "any provision of law to the
contrary." The court never addressed the issue, leaving open the pos-
sibility that any Executive Agreements and Executive Proclamations
which conflict with the ATA might also be unaffected by its passage.
Second, the court examined the legislative history of the ATA, not-
ing that its supporters were forewarned early in the debates that the
Headquarters Agreement might constitute an obstacle. This, in the
court's opinion, should have indicated to the congressmen the impor-
tance of expressing their clear intentions. Instead, "no member of
Congress, at any point, explicitly stated that the ATA was intended to
override any international obligation of the United States."' 82 Most of
the statements concerning the Headquarters Agreement consisted of
congressmen denying that a conflict would arise.8 3 Senator Grassley
stated that "the United States has no international legal obligation
that would preclude it from closing the PLO observer mission. "84
Senator Helms (R-N.C.) claimed that closing the mission would be
"entirely within our Nation's obligations under international law."' 85
Furthermore, Representative Burton (R-Ind.) spoke extensively on the
subject, concluding:
The U.N. headquarters agreement does not even contain the words "ob-
server mission." All observer missions exist under a clause pertaining to
"invitees" that was never intended to cover permanent offices or mis-
sions. All U.N. observer missions remain in New York under the cour-
tesy of the United States and have no - zero - rights in the
headquarters agreement.
86
The court evaluated these commentaries and concluded that the ATA
81. 695 F.Supp. at 1468. Court's "elsewhere" refers to "U.S. law (including any treaty)," at
I01 Stat. at 1343. The weakness of this argument is evident when one recalls that the ATA was
passed as a rider to an act approving the State Department's budget authorizations. The two
documents are unrelated, so specific language used in the primary legislation should not neces-
sarily be taken to mean that Congress' failure to use such language in the ATA was a conscious
decision.
82. 695 F.Supp. at 1470.
83. The commentary in the congressional debates was limited to only about a dozen mem-
bers, including Senators Grassley and Helms. The absence of commentary by other members
might indicate that, had Congress been presented with the question whether to pass the ATA
with an understanding that the Act would violate the Headquarters Agreement, the statute
would never have passed.
84. 133 CONG. REC. S16,605 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1987).
85. 133 CONG. REC. S18,190 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1987).
86. 133 CONG. REC. HI 1,425 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1987).
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supporters were not espousing an intent to overrule the agreement
with the United Nations; they were simply incorrect about what obli-
gations that agreement imposed upon the United States. 87 In defer-
ence to the precedent set down by The Charming Betsy,88 therefore,
the court held that the ATA was inapplicable to the PLO observer
mission to the United Nations in New York City.
The statute remains a valid enactment of general application. It is a
wide gauged restriction of PLO activity within the United States and,
depending on the nature of its enforcement, could effectively curtail any
PLO activities in the United States, aside from the Mission to the United
Nations.
89
The court thus concluded that the ATA, passed to restrict PLO activ-
ity in the United States, did not apply to the PLO's most important
office in this country.
The court, for the most part, applied the "clear, express intent"
doctrine set down by the Supreme Court in 1933. It is not necessarily
the business of a federal district court to provide long paragraphs of
eloquent prose to explain the reasoning behind a doctrine of law, espe-
cially when numerous opinions of the higher courts are available to be
cited as precedent. Presumably, the jurists who first enunciated these
doctrines have written such eloquent explanations in one or more of
those previous cases. With the "clear, express intent" doctrine, how-
ever, no rationale or explanation has ever been given, even though the
doctrine has most recently been described as "a firm and obviously
sound construction against finding implicit repeal of a treaty in ambig-
uous congressional action." 90 This gives rise to two questions. Why
should an express statement of congressional intent be so important to
the courts? More importantly, do the members of Congress realize the
possible consequences of failing to make a clear indication of their in-
tentions when passing legislation which might conflict with a prior
treaty?
To answer the first question, one must accept the Whitney and Chi-
nese Exclusion holdings that Congress has the power to abrogate or
suspend the international obligations of the United States, to the ex-
tent that those obligations apply as domestic law in this country.
Once that power is determined, Congress is the only branch of the
U.S. Government which has the resources to determine when such
action is necessary. Courts are generally not equipped with the re-
sources or the political experience necessary to conclude whether a
given policy, espoused in a treaty with a foreign government, remains
in the best interests of the United States:
87. 695 F.Supp. at 1470-71.
88. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
89. 695 F.Supp. at 1471.
90. Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint., Inc., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984).
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[W]hilst it would always be a matter of the utmost gravity and delicacy
to refuse to execute a treaty, the power to do so [is] prerogative, of which
no nation could be deprived without deeply affecting its independence;
but whether a treaty with a foreign sovereign had been violated by him,
whether the consideration of a particular stipulation of a treaty had been
voluntarily withdrawn by one party so as to no longer to be obligatory
upon the other, and whether the views and acts of a foreign sovereign...
had given just occasion to the political departments of our government
to withhold the execution of a promise contained in a treaty or to act in
direct contravention of such promise, [are] not judicial questions.91
If the courts are inherently unable to make this type of legislative pol-
icy decision, then it must be made by Congress and the Executive. By
interpreting congressional legislation as inconsistent with treaty obli-
gations, courts risk unlawfully intruding into the responsibilities of an-
other branch of the government. 92 For this reason, the courts must
insist upon an express statement of Congress' intention to violate prior
treaties before they read the legislation in a way which would bring
about that result. Without such an expression, the decision is not for
the courts to make.
The second question is more difficult to answer. In the debates
preceding the passage of the ATA, several members of Congress
clearly indicated their awareness that the ATA might violate the
Headquarters Agreement. Senator Pell (D-R.I.) stated that his read-
ing of the bill's language did not,
necessarily require the closure of the PLO Observer Mission to the
United Nations since it is an established rule of statutory interpretation
that U.S. courts will construe congressional statutes as consistent with
U.S. obligations under international law, if such construction is at all
plausible.
93
A month earlier, Senator Grassley made reference to the Whitney case
to support his contention that Congress had the power to pass such
legislation. 94 Still, there is no clear indication that the supporters of
the ATA realized that an express statement was necessary on their
part to overrule the 1947 agreement. As the court pointed out, many
of these advocates mistakenly believed that the new statute would not
conflict with the prior agreement. Yet, such a situation is a firm exam-
ple of the need for the federal courts, preferably the Supreme Court, to
explain the advantages and disadvantages of the "clear, express in-
tent" doctrine. The Court should expressly state the separation of
powers problem which is created when Congress does not make its
intentions clear. Secondly, the Court should expressly state that, in
the context of competing international and domestic concerns, it will
91. Taylor v. Morton, 2 Curtis 254 (1855), quoted in Chinese Exclusion, 130 U.S. at 602.
92. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
93. 133 CONG. REC. S18,185-86 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 1987).
94. 133 CONG. REC. S15,622 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1987).
[Vol. 10:935
Summer 1989] Note, Continued Confusion in Congressional Intent 953
presume that Congress had no intention of violating the United States'
international obligations.95
In cases such as PLO, where members of Congress were "mis-
taken" about the applicability of the Headquarters Agreement, the
Court should re-assert the age-old adage that ignorance of the law is
not a defense. Had such an affirmative statement been made before
the ATA was debated, Congress might never have passed the Act.96
Senators Helms and Grassley avoided putting the issue of whether the
Headquarters Agreement should be violated by the ATA to a vote,
arguing instead that no conflict between the two existed. An explana-
tion by the court would not only fill a void in constitutional jurispru-
dence which has existed for over fifty years, but might make the
debates in the committee rooms of Congress more fruitful in bringing
about well considered legislation.
Despite all of its shortcomings, the district court did not allow the
United States simply to turn its back on its international obligations.
Although the court was disingenuous in its line of reasoning, it did not
"abdicate [its] responsibility to ensure that the executive act in con-
formity with international law,"' 97 and with good reason. The state of
international law is what the participants make of it. Consider Bolt's
Sir Thomas More:
The law, Roper, the law. I know what's legal not what's right. And I'll
stick to what's legal .... I'm not God. The currents and eddies of right
and wrong, which you find such plain-sailing, I can't navigate. I'm no
voyager. But in the thickets of the law, oh, there I'm a forester....
What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get after the
Devil?.... And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned round
on you - where would you hide, Roper, the laws being all flat?....
This country's planted thick with laws from coast to coast - man's
laws, not God's - and if you cut them down... d'you really think that
you could stand upright in the winds that blow them?.... Yes, I'd give
the devil the benefit of the law, for my own safety's sake.98
The United States must live in the international world it helps to cre-
ate. United States' courts cannot shy away from their responsibility to
remind the other branches of our government that our jurisprudence
considers international obligations to be as weighty as domestic legis-
lation. Such obligations cannot be swept aside emotionally or frivo-
lously, and if Congress sees fit to undertake such a sober task, then its
express intention to do so is as important as the soundness of the rea-
soning used to reach that conclusion.
95. This concept is an inverse of The Charming Betsy's doctine that, whenever possible,
courts should not presume that Congress intends to violate a treaty.
96. See supra note 83.
97. Henkin, supra note 64, at 854.
98. R.Bolt, "A Man For All Seasons", Act I, p.147 (Three Plays, Heinemann ed. 1967).
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CONCLUSION
This Note has examined United States v. Palestine Liberation Or-
ganization in two ways. First, it analyzed the New York court's opin-
ion concerning the two primary issues in the case: whether the federal
courts had jurisdiction to consider foreign treaties and agreements
which contain dispute resolution procedures but which also interpret
domestic legislation, and whether the subsequent domestic legislation
effectively overruled the prior treaty simply because it was created
more recently. The court's rationale was contradictory and mislead-
ing, and the opinion, as written, is left to stand for little more than a
series of lost opportunities. The court could have made a strong state-
ment about the deficiencies of the political question doctrine, but in-
stead furthered the confusion surrounding that doctrine with
inconsistent and circular reasoning. The court could have filled a ju-
risprudential void by providing a thoughtful dissertation in support of
the "clear, express intent" doctrine. It chose instead to apply the doc-
trine blindly, stating unequivocally that domestic legislation will never
outweigh international treaties unless Congress makes its intent to do
so clear, supplying string citations of cases for support rather than
reasoned logic or policy.
Second, this Note concentrated on the overall decision of the New
York court, holding that the United States will not violate its interna-
tional obligations by a presumption of the judiciary. In an era when
leading commentators were expressing their fears that American
courts had ignored their responsibilities to ensure the binding force of
international agreements, this decision was a welcome reprieve. De-
spite the flaws in the court's reasoning, it did not allow the ATA, an
emotional reaction to a brief but frightening period in American his-
tory, to undermine an agreement which has created numerous advan-
tages for the United States for over half a century. As a statement of
legal norms, United States v. PLO probably has no precedential value
at all, other than to serve as yet another case in the next string cita-
tion. As an example of a district court's willingness to force the Legis-
lative and Executive branches to respect international obligations,
however, it will hopefully serve as a valuable precedent. Failing that,
it might yet instill in those decision-makers the notion that clarity is
the springboard of action in this context. Without such clarity, the
courts will not give preference to subsequent legislation. International
law is what actors make of it. If the United States expects other coun-
tries to uphold their international obligations, then American courts
cannot disregard their reciprocal responsibilities.
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APPENDIX A
TITLE 22. UNITED STATES CODE (FOREIGN
RELATIONS) CHAPTER 61-ANTI-
TERRORISM-PLO[NEW]
§ 5201. Findings; determinations
(a) Findings
The Congress finds that
(1) Middle East terrorism accounted for 60 percent of total interna-
tional terrorism in 1985;
(2) the Palestine Liberation Organization (hereafter in this title re-
ferred to as the "PLO") was directly responsible for the murder of an
American citizen on the Achille Lauro cruise liner in 1985, and a mem-
ber of the PLO's Executive Committee is under indictment in the United
States for the murder of that American citizen;
(3) the head of the PLO has been implicated in the murder of a
United States Ambassador overseas;
(4) the PLO and its constituent groups have taken credit for, and
been implicated in, the murders of dozens of American citizens abroad;
(5) the PLO Covenant specifically states that "armed struggle is the
only way to liberate Palestine, thus it is an overall strategy, not merely a
tactical phase;
(6) the PLO rededicated itself to the "continuing struggle in all its
armed forms" at the Palestine National Council meeting in April 1987;
and
(7) the Attorney General has stated that "various elements of the
Palestine Liberation Organization and its allies and affiliates are in the
thick of international terror".
(b) Determinations
Therefore, the Congress determines that the PLO and its affiliates are a
terrorist organization and a threat to the interests of the United States,
its allies, and to international law and should not benefit from operating
in the United States.
§ 5202. Prohibitions regarding the PLO
It shall be unlawful if the purpose be to further the interests of the
Palestine Liberation Organization or any of its constituent groups, any
successor to any of those, or agents thereof, on or after the effective date
of this chapter-
(1) to receive anything of value except informational material from
the PLO or any of its constituent groups, any successor thereto, or any
agents thereof,
(2) to expend funds from the PLO or any of its constituent groups,
any successor thereto, or any agents thereof; or
(3) notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, to estab-
lish or maintain an office, headquarters, premises, or other facilities or
establishments within the jurisdiction of the United States at the behest
of, or with funds provided by the Palestine Liberation Organization or
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The Attorney General shall take the necessary steps to institute the
necessary legal action to effectuate the policies and provisions of this
chapter.
(b) Relief
Any district court of the United States for a district in which a viola-
tion of this chapter occurs shall have authority, upon petition of relief by
the Attorney General, to grant injunctive and such other equitable relief
as it shall deem necessary to enforce the provisions of this chapter.
